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NICHOLS V UNITED STATES AND THE




Central to the concept of criminal justice in American society is
the accused's right to a fair trial and the guarantee of due process of
law.' This concept is meaningful in part through the constitutional
guarantee of the right to effective assistance of counsel. 2
 The Sixth
Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense."' Although the right to counsel seems essential to modern
American criminal justice, that right stems from a questionable begin-
ning under English common law and now faces a questionable future. 4
English common law provided no absolute right to counsel.' An
individual accused of a misdemeanor or treason or involved in civil
litigation had a right to retain counsel.' It was not until 1836 that
Parliament passed a law granting all individuals accused of felonies the
right to have counsel in the presentation of their defense.'' Further, it
was not until the Poor Prisoner's Defense Act of 1903 that Parliament
granted the right, albeit discretionary, to appointed counsel.'
I Laurie S. Fulton, Note, The Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 26 AM. Calm.
L. Rt.:v. 1599, 1599 (1989); see also Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During
Police Interrogation, 73 YALE Li, 1000, 1030-31 (1964); Kevin T. Kerr, Note, United Slates v. Henry:
The Further Expansion of the Criminal Defendant's Right to Counsel During Interrogations, 8 PF.P1'.
L. REV. 451, 453-57 (1981); Paula Waborsky, Note, Recruited Government Informants: When Does
the Right to Counsel AUach?-4.1nited States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1989), 8 FLA. Sr. U. L.
REV. 797, 799-800 (1980).
See U.S. Cosrs•r. amend. VI; Fulton, supra note 1, at 1599.
U.S. CoNs•. amend. VI.
4 See Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Gt. 1921, 1927 (1994); Fulton, supra note 1, at 1599-1600.
5
 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932); Fulton, supra note 1, at 1599-1600.
6 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 60; Fulton, supra note 1, at 1599-1600. In 1695, Parliament passed
the Treason Act which established the right to counsel in treason cases and also provided for the
appointment of counsel to indigent defendants. Fulton, supra note 1, at 1600. Even though this
was the English rule, it was highly criticized, as evidenced by Blackstone's remark: "For upon what
face of reason, can the assistance be denied to save the life of a man, which yet is allowed him
in prosecutions for every petty trespass?" Powell, 287 U.S. at 60-61 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *355).
7 Fulton, supra note I, at 1600.
8 Id.
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As English common law did not recognize a right to counsel at
the time of the drafting of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the
American roots of the right to counsel arise from doctrine developed
in the colonies. 9
 From the beginning, the American colonies recog-
nized an accused's right to counsel.'° Indeed, twelve of the thirteen
original colonies rejected the English rule of granting counsel only in
misdemeanor and treason cases. 11 Several states included the right to
counsel in their own state constitutions.' 2 When James Madison intro-
duced the Sixth Amendment on the House and Senate floors of the
First Congress, little debate occurred over the validity of including the
right to counsel in the Bill of Rights, presumably because of its wide-
spread acceptance in colonial American society."
At the time of the passage of the Sixth Amendment, the right to
counsel at a minimum was the right to retain counsel for one's de-
fense.' 4
 This right eventually grew through judicial interpretation to
include the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants." Until
recently, a criminal defendant's right to counsel seemed firmly estab-
lished in modern American jurisprudence."
The mood in American culture, however, has recently shifted away
from protecting the due process rights of criminal defendants to fo-
cusing on issues of crime control,' 7
 In large measure, this is a response
to the epidemic of violence that currently plagues American streets."
This shift of concerns in the American psyche has affected the criminal
justice system. 19
 Many constitutional protections are now vulnerable to
9 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 64-65; Fulton, supra note I, at 1603-04.
lu See Powell 287 U.S. at 61-65; Fulton, supra note 1, at 1603-04.
It Powell 287 U.S. at 64.
12 1d. at 61; Fulton, supra note 1, at 1603-04.
15 See Fulton, supra note I, at 1604.
14 Id. at 1605.
15 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
16 See Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1927 (1994).
17 See, e.g., Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1351, 1352 (1993); Lisa P. Taylor, Note, Illinois v. Perkins: Balancing the Need for Effective Law
Enforcement Against a Suspect's Constitutional Rights, 1991 Wts. L. Rev. 989, 1015-16; Linda
Chavez & Chris Gersten, Tough Bills Pose Dilemma for President, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at
25. Congress has increasingly been "getting tough on crime" through crime bills and other efforts,
such as limiting habeas corpus. See, e.g., Chavez & Gersten, supra, at 25, 26. In the states, there
is a renewed movement to bring back the death penalty. See, e.g., Mitchell Krapes & Jay Lippman,
Constitutionality of New York's Proposed Death Penalty Statute, N.Y. Li., Feb. 24, 1995, at 1, 11. The
popular political rhetoric of the day focuses on the need to get tough on crime. See Chavez &
Gersten, supra, at 25-26; Gail D. Cox, Voters Tough on Criminals, NAT'L L.J., November 21, 1994,
at A6; Krapes & Lippman, supra, at 1, 11.
18 See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 17 , at 1352.
19 See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927.
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limitations in this environment." This vulnerability is highlighted in
the area of the Sixth Amendment right to counse1. 21 Although the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has historically protected the fundamen-
tal right to a fair trial, the United States Supreme Court has recently
curtailed that right in a potentially serious manner. 22
This Note argues that the recent United States Supreme Court
decision of Nichols v. United States seriously curtails the previous pro-
tections afforded a criminal defendant under the Sixth Amendment.°
In addition, this Note contends that the Court reached its decision in
Nichols for reasons of administrative ease rather than out of loyalty to
constitutional principles. Section I discusses the background and de-
velopment of the constitutional right to counsel in both felony and
misdemeanor cases. 24 Section II examines Baldasar v. Illinois, and the
Supreme Court's first attempt at resolving the issue of the collateral
use of prior uncounseled misdemeanors in determining criminal sen-
tences.25 Section HI examines the Supreme Court's decision and rea-
soning in Nichols v. United States, which overruled Baldasar. 26 Finally,
Section IV considers the implications of the Nichols decision on the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 27
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. The Foundation of the Right to Counsel
The constitutional right to counsel has evolved over time through
judicial interpretation. 28 For many years, the right to counsel clause of
the Sixth Amendment implied only that an individual defendant had
the right to retain counsel.2° It was not until 1932, in the landmark case
of Powell v. Alabama, that the right to counsel began to evolve into a
significant constitutional doctrine." Interestingly, Powell involved the
25 See id. Similarly, Congress has attempted to limit habeas corpus. See Chavez & Gersten,
supra note 17, at 26.
21 See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927.
22 Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (recognizing the fundamental
right to counsel) with Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927, 1928 (curtailing the right to counsel).
23 1 1 4 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
24 See infra notes 28-109 and accompanying text.
25 446 U.S. 222 (1980); see infra notes 110-76 and accompanying text.
'N See infra notes 177-220 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 221-311 and accompanying text.
28 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40, 344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 68-70, 71 (1932).
29 Fulton, supra note 1, at 1605.
30 See Powell 287 U.S. at 71; Fulton, supra note 1, at 1605.
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right to counsel found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than the Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth
Amendment:"
In Powell, the United States Supreme Court held that a state trial
court had denied the defendants due process of law under the Four-
teenth Amendment by failing to provide meaningful assistance of
counsel in a capital case." In Powell, four African Americans were
charged with the rape of two white girls, a potential capital offense
under Alabama law." The trial court first failed to provide the defen-
dants with the time necessary to secure counsel, and then failed to
allow that counsel time to prepare for the rather speedy trial. 34
 The
Supreme Court declared the right to effective assistance of counsel in
a capital case a fundamental right contained within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 35 As such, the
Court held that due process of law required all courts, state and
federal, to assign counsel to an indigent defendant in a capital case."
The Court did not reach any decision on the implications of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel clause. 37
In 1938, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the United States Supreme Court first
examined the right to counsel clause of the Sixth Amendment." In
Johnson, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment required federal
courts to provide counsel for indigent defendants in all criminal pro-
ceedings." The trial court convicted the defendant in this case, with-
out the benefit of counsel, of "possessing and uttering" counterfeit
money. 4° The defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus that eventu-
ally reached the Supreme Court.'" The Supreme Court reasoned that
the Sixth Amendment implicitly recognized that the average defendant
lacks the professional legal skills necessary to protect himself or herself
when faced with a conviction that may result in the loss of life or
31 287 U.S. at 71.
32 Id.
n Id. at 49, 50.
34 Id. at 53, 71. The trial began on April 6, one week after the indictment was returned and
the arraignment occurred. Id. at 53.
36 Id. at 71. The Court stated that this right was contained within the Fourteenth Amendment
and applied to the states. See id. at 67. Therefore, there was no need to incorporate the Sixth
Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
37 See id. at 67, 71.
38 304 U.S. 958, 462-63 (1938).
32 Id. at 463.
4° Id. at 459.
41 Id.
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liberty. 42
 Therefore, the Court concluded that in all criminal cases in
federal court, the Sixth Amendment mandated the appointment of
counsel for indigent defendants."
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in 1942 in Betts v. Brady held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
guarantee the same right to counsel to criminal defendants in state
court as the Sixth Amendment guaranteed to criminal defendants in
federal court." In Betts, a Maryland state court tried and convicted the
defendant of robbery without providing the defendant the assistance
of counsel." The United States Supreme Court reasoned that the
denial of counsel in Betts was not so offensive to common and funda-
mental ideas of fairness as to constitute a violation of due process."
The Court concluded, therefore, that the refusal to appoint counsel
to an indigent defendant in state court did not necessarily violate the
Fourteenth Amendment and due process of law. 47
In 1963, in the landmark decision of Gideon v. Wainwright, the
Supreme Court overruled Betts." In Gideon, the Court held that an in-
dividual's Sixth Amendment right to counsel also applied in state court
through incorporation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." In Gideon, a
Florida state court convicted the defendant of felony breaking and
entering into a poolroom." The Florida trial court denied Gideon's
request for counsel, and thus, he acted pro se in his own defense. 5 I
The trial court convicted Gideon and the Florida Supreme Court
upheld that conviction."
42 Id. at 462-63.
43
 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463. The Supreme Court has also recognized that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel applies to the critical stages of a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., Kuhlman
v, Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986) (right to counsel violated by deliberate elicitation by police
or informant); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I, 3, 9 (1970) (right to counsel at preliminary
hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221, 236-37 (1967) (right to counsel at post-in-
dictment line-ups); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1961) (right to counsel at arraign-
ment).
44 316 U.S. 455, 471, 473 (1942);Johtimm, 304 U.S. at 463.
46 Betts, 316 U.S. at 456-57.
46 See id. at 473.
97
 Id.
43 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
42 Id. at 340, 342.
ld. at 336-37. Gideon broke into the poolroom for the purpose of committing a misde-
meanor once inside. Id. at 336. This was a felony under Florida law. Id, at 336-37.
5 ' Id. at 337.
52 Id.
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The United States Supreme Court, overruling Betts, held that the
Florida state court had denied Gideon his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel." The Court determined that a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is fundamental and essential to a fair
trial." Therefore, the Court reasoned, incorporation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel into the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment guaranteed this right." The Sixth Amendment
right to counsel consequently applied to those defendants charged
with crimes in state courts." For that reason, the Court concluded that
all indigent defendants had a right to appointed counsel under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 57
B. Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases
Gideon established that, at least in felony cases, state and federal
courts had to provide indigent criminal defendants with counsel for
their defense.58 In 1972, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the
right to counsel in misdemeanor cases." In that year, in Argersinger v.
Hamlin, the United States Supreme Court held that indigent defen-
dants have a right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments in any type of criminal case."
In Argersinger, the trial court convicted the defendant, without the
benefit of counsel, of carrying a concealed weapon. 5' He was then
sentenced to ninety days imprisonment. 62 The Florida Supreme Court
upheld the uncounseled conviction, reasoning that the right to coun-
sel existed only for non-petty offenses punishable by more than six
months imprisonment."
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme
Court decision, holding that a defendant could not be deprived of
liberty, regardless of the classification of the crime, without the repre-
53 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45.
m Id. at 344.
55 See id. 340,342.
56 Id. at 344-45.
57 Id.
58 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45.
59 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,37 (1972). There is no cohesive definition distinguish-
ing misdemeanors and felonies. See jouN H. LINDQUIST, MISDEMEANOR CRIME, TRIVIA'. CRIMINAL
PURSUIT 16-18 (1988). Typically, the jurisdiction defines the distinction between the two by the
length of the potential sentence for the crime. Id.
19) See 407 U.S. at 37.
61 Id. at 26.
52 Id.
1).'l Id. at 26-27.
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sentation of counsel." The Court reasoned that the complexities and
implications associated with misdemeanor convictions often equally
require effective counsel." The Court gave several reasons why a mis-
demeanor conviction was, in many ways, just as serious as a felony
conviction and thus warranted the same type of constitutional protec-
tions." First, the Court stated that the legal and constitutional ques-
tions raised in a case that leads to brief imprisonment are not neces-
sarily less complex than a case that may send a person to prison for six
months or more.° Second, the Court stated that defendants often need
counsel to advise them on all possible ramifications of a guilty plea in
both felony and misdemeanor cases." Finally, the Court illuminated
the point that misdemeanor court is characterized by "assembly-line
justice," and that reports indicated that those defendants with counsel
are five times as likely to have all charges dismissed than those with-
out." Recognizing that these peculiar problems accompany misde-
meanor and petty offense convictions, the Court concluded that the
defendant needed counsel to ensure due process of law." The United
States Supreme Court held, therefore, that a court could not deprive
a person of his or her liberty, regardless of the classification of the
charge as a felony or a misdemeanor, unless that person was repre-
sented by counsel at tria1. 71
Chief Justice Burger wrote a concurring opinion in Argersinger in
which he asserted that the majority opinion would create practical
difficulties for judges and lawyers." He anticipated that judges and
prosecutors would engage in "predictive evaluation" to determine the
likelihood of a jail sentence for a specific misdemeanor conviction in
order to determine whether to provide counsel." Burger believed that
the courts would appoint counsel only upon a likelihood of a depri-
vation of liberty through a prison sentence. 14 Even with the practi-
cal difficulties of determining when counsel was needed, however,
Burger believed that, in the long run, the decision moved the Court
64
 Id. at 37.
65 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36-57.
66 Id. at 33-36.
67 Id. at 33.
68 Id. at 34.
69 Id. at 36.
" Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37, 40.
71 Id. at 37.
72 Id. at 42-43 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
75 1d. at 42 (Burger, 	 concurring).
74 See id. (Burger, Cj., concurring).
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in the proper direction for Sixth Amendment jurisprudence." Justice
Burger stated that despite the potential administrative difficulties of
the Court's opinion, "the dynamics of the profession have a way of
rising to the burdens placed on it." 75 Justice Burger also pointed out,
however, that a clear rule drawing the line for the right to counsel for
charges with potential penalties in excess of six months imprisonment
would be better than the majority rule."
Justice Powell also concurred in the Argersinger judgment, but
reasoned that the approach of the majority created a rigid rule and
that a rule centering on the right to a fair trial and giving judges more
leeway in determining when counsel was needed would make more
sense." Justice Powell cautioned against a rule requiring counsel in all
non-felony cases as that would create large costs and burden the crimi-
nal justice systems of the states." In addition, he felt that the rule
announced by the majority in Argersinger would create administrative
and systemic problems making the application of the right to counsel
impractical, unreasonable and unfair. 8° Justice Powell asserted that
courts should determine the existence of a right to counsel for misde-
meanor charges on a case by case basis based on judicial discretion. 51
He believed that a discretionary rule would maintain the right to
counsel in cases where it was necessary to guarantee a fair tria1. 82 At
the same time, the rule would prevent some of the systemic and
institutional problems that he identified in the application of the
majority opinion."
In an attempt to clarify its Argersinger decision, the United States
Supreme Court, in 1978, held in Scott v. Illinois that the right to counsel
for indigent defendants in misdemeanor cases applied only in the case
75 A g	 'nger, 407 U.S. at 41, 42 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
78 Id. at 44 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
77 Id. at 41 (Burger, CJ., concurring). Justice Burger, however, recognized that any depriva-
don of liberty, no matter how slight, could be a very serious matter. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
78 Id. at 47, 63 (Powell, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 52 (Powell, J., concurring).
See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 54-55 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell raised concerns
about equal protection problems that may result from limited sentencing options, the likelihood
that counsel will be appointed in almost all cases, and the significant burden the rule imposed
on "already overburdened local courts." Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
81 Id. at 65 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell recommended three factors that judges
should consider in determining whether the right to counsel existed. Id. at 64 (Powell, J.,
concurring). These were, (1) the complexity of the offense, (2) the likely sentence, and (3) the
specific factors of that case. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
82 See id. at 65-66 (Powell, J., concurring).
88 See id. at 65, 65-66 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Douglas and
Justice Stewart, also wrote a brief concurring opinion. Id. at 40-41 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Brennan advocated the use of law students and legal aid bureaus as a way of addressing the new
need for lawyers created by the Court's decision. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
May 1996)	 UNCOUNSELED MISDEMEANORS
	 565
of an actual sentence of imprisonment." In Scott, the trial court con-
victed the defendant of shoplifting. 85
 The state court imposed a fine
but no imprisonment even though the statute under which the court
sentenced the defendant authorized imprisonment." Both the convic-
don and sentence occurred without the assistance of counse1. 87 The
defendant argued that he had a right to counsel for this misdemeanor
conviction because the statute authorized imprisonment."
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's arguments, reason-
ing that the rationale underlying the decision in Argersinger was that
the protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
should extend only to the threat of the loss of liberty. 89
 Therefore, the
Court reasoned that the actual imposition of imprisonment was central
to the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases." On this basis, the Court
refused to extend the right to counsel to the defendant in Scott, hold-
ing instead that the right existed only in cases where the court actually
imposed imprisonment for a misdemeanor. 9'
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion, stating that consistent
with his concurrence in Argersinger, he would adopt a more flexible
rule.92
 Although Powell did not believe that the Constitution required
the rule in Argersinger, he was mindful of stare decisis and therefore
asserted what he believed was a better approach in this case." Spe-
cifically, Justice Powell noted the Court's imprisonment threshold im-
posed an arbitrary standard that would preclude the right to counsel
"in other types of cases in which conviction can have more serious
consequences."'" Rejecting the Court's bright-line test, he advocated
giving courts more flexibility in assessing whether the right to counsel
should exist." Recognizing that hundreds of busy courts would con-
front this problem daily, Justice Powell stated that he "hoped" the
Court would provide more guidance in the future and eventually adopt
a more flexible rule.'"
84
 440 U.S. 367,373-74 (1979).
85 Id. at 368.
86 Id. The statute set a maximum penalty at one year in jail or a $500 fine, or both. Id.
87 See id.
" Id,
HY Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
9° Id. at 373-74.
Yi Id.
92 Id. at 374-75 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. (Powell, j., concurring).
94 Scott, 440 U.S. at 374 (Powell, .1., concurring).
95 Id. at 375 (Powell, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 374-75 (Powell, j., concurring).
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In a dissenting opinion, justice Brennan objected to the majority's
restriction of the Sixth Amendment right to counse1. 97
 He stated that
the majority ignored the relevant precedent and principles under the
Court's Sixth Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence in adopting
the "actual imprisonment" rule." Brennan believed that a sounder
constitutional rule would require counsel if imprisonment were statu-
torily authorized for the offense." Brennan concluded by stating that
the Court's decision in Scott resembled the Court's decision in Betts v.
Brady, which the Court later declared an "'anachronism when handed
down' [and a case] that 'made an abrupt break with its well-considered
precedents."'E 0°
Justice Blackmun, also in dissent, asserted that the right to counsel
should extend to cases where a statute authorizes imprisonment of six
months."' Noting that the right to a jury trial attached at this point,
Blackmun believed the right to counsel should similarly extend as
far. 102
 Therefore, he advocated a rule where the right to counsel at-
tached whenever the defendant was prosecuted for a non-petty offense
punishable by more than six months imprisonment)" In accord with
Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun stated that this bright-line rule
would be truer to the constitutional principles and considerations
underlying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.'"
This line of cases established a general right to counsel that has
since been narrowed)" The rule of Gideon, that the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments required the right to counsel in criminal cases,
was a broad rule that the Court later refined. 1 D6 First, in Argersinger, the
57 Id. at 389 (Brennan, j., dissenting).
98 See id. (Brennan, j., dissenting). Brennan focused on the language of the Sixth Amend-
ment and on the Court's reasoning in Gideon and Argersinger See id. at 379 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
"Scott, 440 U.S. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan called this the "authorized impris-
onment" rule. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan rejected the arguments that the "authorized
imprisonment" rule would create havoc in the criminal justice system. Id. at 385-88 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). He believed that states were adequately equipped to handle that rule. Id. (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 389 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45
(1963)).
101 Scott, 440 U.S. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1112 id. at 389 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The constitutional right to trial by jury extends to
cases where the potential imprisonment may exceed six months. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 159, 161 (1968).
SCOU, 440 U.S. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1® See id. at 390 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
Baldwin v, New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)),
1® See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1962).
°6 See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74 (right to counsel in misdemeanor cases only when sentence
of imprisonment); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (right to counsel in any felony case).
May 1996]
	
UNCOUNSELED MISDEMEANORS 	 567
Court clarified the broad rule of Gideon and applied the right to
counsel in misdemeanor cases.'° 7 Scott then announced a rule more
limited than Argersinger and required that counsel be appointed only
when the defendant's conviction actually resulted in a prison sen-
tence. 108
 Based on these cases and consistent with the constitutional
protections against the deprivation of liberty, the right to counsel
existed only when a court imposed a term of incarceration for the
conviction of a misdemeanor. 100
II. COLLATERAL USE OF UNCOUNSELED MISDEMEANORS
A. Baldasar v. Illinois
Given the status of the law after Argersinger and Scott, a difficulty
arose when a court used a valid misdemeanor conviction obtained
without counsel to enhance a subsequent sentence for another crime
under a recidivist statute."'" This problem existed because an uncoun-
seled misdemeanor that did not result in a prison sentence could
enhance a later sentence and effectively result in imprisonment."' In
1980, in Baldasar v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court held that
it violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for courts to use prior
uncounseled misdemeanors to enhance a subsequent sentence." 2
In Baldasar, the defendant was convicted of misdemeanor theft in
1975 without the assistance of counsel and sentenced to a fine and
probation." 3 Later that year, he was charged for a subsequent theft and
the state used the prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to con-
vert the theft to a felony, which resulted in jail time."" The Illinois
Appellate Court held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments did
not bar the imposition of an enhanced sentence of a prison term based
on the uncounseled misdemeanor." 5
107
 See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37, 40.
108 See Scott, 440 U,S. at 373-74.
109 See id. at 373.
"° See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); David S.
Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions After Scott and Baldasar, 34
U. FLA. L. Rev. 517, 527 (1982); Lily Fu, Note, High Crimes from Misdemeanors: The Collateral Use
of Prior, Uncounseled Misdemeanors Under the Sixth Amendment, Baldasar and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 77 MINN. L. REV. 165, 172 (1992).
in See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227-28 (Marshall, J., concurring); Fu, supra note 110, at 172.
112 Balrlasar, 446 U.S. at 224 (per curiam); id. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring).
113 /d. at 223 (per curiam).
" 4 Id. (per curiam). The applicable Illinois statute provided that a second conviction for the
same offense of theft of property worth less than $150 may be treated as a felony and punishable
by a term of imprisonment of one to three years. Id. (per curiam).
"5 Id. (per curiam),
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and then
reversed the state court's decision in a per curiam opinion." 6 The
Court, however, failed to issue a majority opinion." 7 Rather, the per
curiam opinion referred to the reasons set forth in the three concur-
ring opinions and reversed the Illinois Appellate Court's judgment. 18
The Court therefore implicitly concluded that the state court had
improperly used the prior uncounseled misdemeanor to convert the
defendant's subsequent misdemeanor into a felony and thereby en-
hance the sentence for the subsequent crime." 9
Justice Stewart concurred and stated simply that "it seems clear to
me" that this prison sentence violated the constitutional rule of Scott
v. Illinois.'" Justice Blackmun also wrote a separate concurring opinion
in which he stated that he still favored the six month authorized im-
prisonment bright-line rule that he advocated in his dissent in Scott.'"
He nonetheless considered the result in this case consistent with that
rule based on the facts of the case, and he therefore concurred.' 22
Justice Marshall, in a separate concurring opinion, stated that the
court did not appropriately use the prior uncounseled misdemeanor
in sentence enhancement.' 23 Justice Marshall asserted that the central
issue under Argersinger and Scott was whether the court denied the
defendants of their liberty without the assistance of counsel.'" In this
case, Marshall contended, the defendant would not have received a
prison term but for the uncounseled conviction.'" Marshall concluded
that Scott and Argersinger directly prohibited such a use of an uncoun-
seled misdemeanor in the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment.' 26
Therefore, according to Justice Marshall, the sentencing court could
116 M. at 222,224 (per curiam).
117 See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 222 (per curiam); id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring); id, at 224
(Marshall, J., concurring); Id. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
1113 1d. at 224 (per curiam).
119 See id. (per curiam). The Court stated simply, "[fl or the reasons stated in the concurring
opinions, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Appellate Court of Illinois,
Second District, for further proceedings." Id. (per curiam).
120 1d. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J„ concurring).
122 See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun's dissent
in Scott advocated the adoption of a rule requiring the appointment of counsel in all cases where
the defendant faced a possible jail term of six months or more. Scott v, Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
389-90 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122
	 446 U.S. at 226,227-28 (Marshall, J., concurring).
124 Id. at 226 (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall maintained, however, that he believed Scott
v. Illinois was wrongly decided. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 225 (Marshall, J., concurring).
126 1d. at 227 (Marshall, J., concurring).
126 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
May l9961	 UNCOUNSELED MISDEMEANORS 	 569
not use the defendant's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to
enhance his subsequent sentence.'"
In the sole dissenting opinion, Justice Powell asserted that the
result reached by the Court created practical problems for courts in
deciding misdemeanor cases and was inconsistent with the Court's
holding in Scott. 128 justice Powell reasoned that sentence enhancement
penalizes only the offense for which the defendant is being punished
at that time, and does not affect the validity of the original convic-
tion. 129 As such, Justice Powell asserted that a court should be able to
use a valid conviction to enhance a subsequent sentence.'" Indeed,
Justice Powell asserted that the logical consequence of the right to
counsel jurisprudence would permit courts to use prior valid uncoun-
seled misdemeanor convictions in sentence enhancement because the
Supreme Court had recognized the constitutional validity of those
convictions."' Justice Powell concluded by predicting that the Court's
decision would result in a great deal of confusion and difficulty for
lower courts.'"
Thus, after Baldasar, it appeared that a court could not use a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor in enhancing the sentence of a subsequent
conviction.'" Scott and Argersinger had created and defined the right
to counsel in misdemeanor cases involving actual imprisonment.'m As
a commentator stated, these cases left open the question of whether a
court could impose a sentence of imprisonment based on a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction . 135 Baldasar seemed to answer in
the negative.'"
127 /d. at 227-28 (Marshall, J., concurring).
128 Id. at 231, 234, 235 (Powell, J., dissenting).
129 Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id. at 231 (Powell, J., dissenting).
191 See id. at 232-33 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell argued that although the Court
had found that courts could not rely on tmcounseled felonies for sentence enhancement, mis-
demeanors had been treated differently. Id, (Powell, J., dissenting). After Gideon, the case law on
felonies and misdemeanors with respect to the right to counsel took separate routes. Baldasar,
446 U.S. at 232-33 (Powell, J., dissenting). An uncounseled felony is an invalid conviction, while
an uncounseled misdemeanor is valid if no term of imprisonment is imposed. Id. (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Therefore, according to Justice Powell, consistent with the case law on misdemeanors
as expressed in Argersinger and Scott, a valid misdemeanor conviction should be available to
enhance a subsequent sentence. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 233 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"2 Id. at 234-35 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"3 Id. at 224 (per curiam); id. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring).
"1 Scott V, Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 40
(1972).
”15 See Fu, supra note 110, al 172.
"6 See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224 (per curiam); id. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also
Fu, supra note 110, at 175, 180.
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B. The Application of Baldasar
The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds."'" Because Baldasar is such a case where no
one opinion represented a majority, courts and legislatures have em-
ployed this technique in interpreting its meaning.'" In the case of
Baldasar, however, the attempts to apply the narrowest grounds test
have produced a myriad of results.' 3°
1. Lower Court Application
Several courts, both state and federal, have held that Justice Mar-
shall's concurrence in Baldasar constitutes the proper rationale in the
case and have barred any subsequent use of an uncounseled misde-
meanor.' 4° For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Williams reasoned that Baldasarbarred
the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanors for enhancing a sentence
of imprisonment."' In Williams, a juvenile challenged the use of prior,
nonjury juvenile adjudications under the reasoning of Baldasar.'" The
Ninth Circuit, as well as other courts that have adopted this rationale,
found that the consensus of the opinions in Baldasar was that an
uncounseled conviction, although valid, was invalid to impose a prison
sentence."' As such, this court, and others, have applied Baldasar to
137 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
I" See, e.g., United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 219 n.8 (5th Cir. 1990); Santillanes v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 754 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 1985). See generally Linda Novak,
Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 CoLum. L Ray. 756, 769-74
(1980).
199
	 infra notes 140-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application and
inconsistent results of the narrowest ground test.
14° See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Williams,
891 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1037 (1990); Pananen v. State, 711 P.2d
528, 531, 532 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Lovell v. State, 678 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Ark. 1984); State v.
Vares, 801 P.2d 555, 557 (Haw. 1990); State v. Cooper, 343 N.W.2d 485, 486 (Iowa 1984); State v.
Oehm, 680 P.2d 309, 311-12 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Ulibarri, 632 P.2d 746, 747 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1981); City of Pendleton v Standerfer, 688 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. 1984); Sargent v. Commonwealth,
360 S,F.,2d 895, 899-901 (Va. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Armstrong, 332 S.E,2d 837, 840-41 (W. Va.
1985).
141 Williams, 891 F.2d at 214.
"2 Id.
145 See id.; accord Brady, 928 F.3d at 854; Sargent, 360 S.E.2d at 899-901.
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preclude the imposition of an increased sentence based on an uncoun-
seled misdemeanor. 144
Other courts have adopted, and modified Justice Blackmun's the-
ory of the bright-line rule. 145 For example, in 1985, in Santillanes v.
United States Parole Commissioner, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit adopted Justice Blackmun's reasoning and held
that Baldasar barred only an invalid prior uncounseled misdemeanor
from use in sentence enhancement. 146 justice Blackmun's concurrence
in Baldasar asserted that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor was valid
only if the statute authorized a maximum prison sentence of less than
six months. 147 Because Baldasar presented a case where the statute
authorized imprisonment of greater than six months, Blackmun con-
curred on the ground that his six month authorized imprisonment
rule barred the sentence enhancement and rendered the sentence
invalid.'" The Tenth Circuit, and other courts that follow this reason-
ing, have held, therefore, that if the original conviction is invalid, a
court may not use it to enhance a subsequent sentence.' 49 Conversely,
if the original conviction is valid, it may be used for enhancement.' 5°
Some courts have even gone so far as to hold that enhancement can
occur only when the prior misdemeanor was punishable by more than
six months imprisonment.' 51
Still other courts have held that the Baldasar opinion does not in
any respect bar the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanors in sen-
tence enhancement. 152 For example, in 1990, in United States v. Eckford,
144 See Williams, 891 F,2c1 at 214; accord Brady, 928 F.2c1 at 854.
145 See, e.g., Santillancs v. United States Parole Conim'n, 754 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 1985);
Hlad v. State, 565 So. 2d 762, 764-67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171,
175-76 (N.D. 1985); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 507 A.2d 57, 60-61 & n.11 (Pa. 1986); State v.
Novak, 318 N.W.2d 364, 368-69 (Wis. 1982).
148 754 F.2d at 889.
147 See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S, 222, '229-30 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
148 See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
149 See Santillanes, 754 F.2c1 at 889; Hied, 565 So. '2d at 764-67.
150 See Santillanes, 754 F.2(1 at 889; Iliad, 565 So. 2d at 764-67.
151 See, e.g., Hlad, 565 So, 2d at 764-67; State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 176 (N.D. 1985);
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 507 A.2d 57, 60-61 (Pa. 1986); State v. Novak, 318 N.W.2d 364, 368-69
(Wis. 1982). Justice Blackmun concurred in Baldasar because the decision was consistent with
the six month bright-line rule he advocated in Scott arid Argersinger. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 229-30
(Blackmun, J., concurring). That rule, however, was never adopted by the Court. See Nichols v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1927 (1994). Therefore, it seems odd for these courts to adopt his
reasoning as it rests on a rule that is not and never was the constitutional standard. See id.
152 See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d 496, 499-500 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied
sub nom. Clinton-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. CL 1250 (1993); United States v. Eckford, 910
F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1990); Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit. Court, 715 F.2d 341, 346-47 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); United States v. Robles Sandoval, 637 F.2d 692, 693 &
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
Baldasar did not bar the use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor in
sentence enhancement.'" Eckford involved a valid uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction that the trial court subsequently used to enhance
a sentence for attempted robbery.' 54 The Fifth Circuit, as well as other
courts that have adopted similar reasoning, focused on the splintering
of the Supreme Court in Baldasar and the absence of a common
rationale in the concurrences. 155 Due to the great deal of confusion in
interpreting Baldasar, this court, and others, have essentially ignored
the holding of Baldasar and found that it does not bar the subsequent
use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor in sentence enhancement in
any case.' 56
2. The United States Sentencing Guidelines
Lower courts, both state and federal, are not alone in their incon-
sistent application of Baldasar 157 In 1990, the United States Sentenc-
ing Commissionm (the "Commission") amended the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines") to permit the use of uncoun-
seled misdemeanors in sentence enhancement.' 59 The Commission
n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941 (1981); Sheffield v. City of Pass Christian, 556 So. 2d
1052, 1053 (Miss. 1990).
153 Eckford, 910 F.2d at 220.
154 Id. at 217-18.
155 Id. at 219-20; see Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d at 499-500.
156 ECkfard, 910 F.2d at 220; see Castro- Vega, 945 F.2d at 500; Schindler, 715 F.2d at 346-47. Still
other courts, unclear that there is a narrowest ground in Baldasar or that the case stands for a
specific proposition, have invented there own standards for the use of uncounseled misdemeanors
in sentence enhancement. See, e.g., Wilson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 1158, 1159 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981) (Baldasar bars converting subsequent misdemeanor to felony with
prison term); Moore v. State, 352 S.E.2d 821, 822 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 904 (1987)
(Baldasar bars enhancement only when ultimate sentence is greater than that authorized under
the statute or if enhancement converts a misdemeanor to felony); State v. Laurick, 575 A.2d 1340,
1347 (N.J.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 (1990) (Baldasar bars enhancement when ultimate sentence
is greater than that authorized in absence of prior uncounseled misdemeanor or enhancement
converts misdemeanor to felony).
157 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
§ 4A1.2 (1994) [hereinafter USSG]; Fu, supra note 110, at 175-77.
158 The Commission is an independent agency of the judicial branch and is composed of
seven voting and two nonvoting members. THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING
LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (2d ed. 1994).
159 See USSG, supra note 157, § 4A1.2 Be Commentary, Background; Fu, supra note 110, at
176-77. Previously, there was ambiguity as to what Baldasar required under the Guidelines. Fu,
supra note 110, at 177. The old Guidelines stated, "if to count an uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction would result in the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment under circumstances
that would violate the United States Constitution, then such conviction shall not be counted in
the criminal history score." Id.
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passed this amendment despite the Supreme Court's holding in Balda-
sari°
The Guidelines were developed after Congress passed the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act" ). 16 ' The Act authorizes the
United States Sentencing Commission to create guidelines for achiev-
ing honesty, uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.' 62 Under the
Guidelines, a defendant is placed in a criminal history category based
on the number of criminal history points that are calculated by a
formula established in the Guidelines.' 65 A range for sentencing is then
calculated based on the criminal history category.' 64 The Guidelines
require judges to sentence a defendant within the calculated range,
with some exceptions.' 65 The Guidelines permit judicial discretion to
"downward depart" from the calculated range if the factual circum-
stances indicate that the criminal history category does not accurately
reflect the seriousness of the defendant's crimes.' 66
After Baldasar, the Guidelines permitted courts to use prior un-
counseled misdemeanors in the calculation of criminal history catego-
ries.' 67 In the background commentary of section 4A 1.2, the Guidelines
explicitly state, contrary to Baldasar, "[p]rior sentences, not other-
wise excluded, are to be counted in the criminal history score, includ-
ing uncounseled misdemeanor sentences where imprisonment was not im-
posed."168 Based on the clear language of the Guidelines, its drafters
apparently believed that if a conviction was valid under Scott and
Argersinger, then a court could use the uncounseled misdemeanor
sentence for enhancement of a subsequent sentence.m Indeed, in
1992, the Commission implied in a publication that it did not believe
Baldasar viable.' 7° In addition, the Commission stated explicitly that as
16° See Fu, supra note 110, at 176-77.
161 See HUTCHINSON, supra note 158, at 2.
162 Id.
16! See Fu, supra note 110, at 176 n.66.
164 See id.
166 See USSG, supra note 157, § 4A1.3; Fu, supra note 110, at 176 n.66.
166 See USSG, supra note 157, § 4A1.3; see also Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1930
(1994) (Sauter, J., concurring).
167 See USSG, supra note 157, § 4A1.2 & Commentary, Background. Section 4A1.2 is entitled
"Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History." Id.
16B USSG, supra note 157, § 4A1.2 & Commentary, Background (emphasis added); see also
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 224 (1980) (per curiam); 13aldasar, 446 U.S. at 227-28 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
169 See USSG, supra note 157, § 4A1.2 & Commentary, Background; UNITED STATES SENTENC-
ING COMMISSION, MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOU'l"rHE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 24
(6th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS].
17° See Mos-r FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 169, at 24.
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long as counsel was not constitutionally required,I 7 ' a court could use
the conviction of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor to calculate the
defendant's criminal history.' 72
In sum, the Supreme Court's opinion in Baldasar resulted in
inconsistent lower court application.'" Given the lack of a majority
opinion, courts adopted piecemeal reasoning on the use of prior
uncounseled misdemeanors.I 74
 In addition, the United States Sentenc-
ing Guidelines rejected the holding of Baldasar. 175
 As a commentator
stated, the confusion and rejection of the Baldasar opinion made a
Supreme Court clarification on the use of prior uncounseled misde-
meanors imminent. 176
III. NICHOLS V. UNITED STATES
In 1994, in Nichols v. United States the United States Supreme
Court overruled Baldasar.' 77
 The Court held that a court could rely on
an uncounseled misdemeanor, valid under Scott, for enhancing the
sentence of a subsequent offense.' 79
 The defendant in Nichols, without
the assistance of counsel, had been convicted in 1983 of a state mis-
demeanor for driving under the influence and fined $250.' 19 Sub-
sequently, in 1990, the defendant pleaded guilty in federal court to
possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.' 90
 Under the United States
171 See id. The Commission was referring to the rule of Scott which requires counsel only in
cases of actual imprisonment. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
172 See MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 169, at 24. The Commission stated:
[T]he fact that a conviction was uncounseled does not automatically mean that the
conviction was constitutionally invalid. In the case of a felony or misdemeanor, for
example, the defendant may have waived counsel. Or, in the case of a misdemeanor,
a term of imprisonment may not have been imposed and thus provision of counsel
would not have been constitutionally required. The Background Commentary to
§ 4A1.2 expressly states the Commission's intent that prior sentences not otherwise
excluded are to be counted in the calculation of the defendant's criminal history
score, including uncounseled misdemeanors where imprisonment was not imposed.
Id. (citing United States v. Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Eckford, 910
F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1990)).
175 See supra notes 140-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of inconsistent lower court
application of Baldasar.
174 See id.
175 See supra notes 157-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines.
176 See Fu, supra note 110, at 193-94.
I"Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (1994).
178
 /d. at 1927.
179 Id. at 1924. Nichols pleaded nolo contendere to the driving under the influence charge.
Id. at 1931 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The applicable Georgia statute at the time of the conviction
provided for a maximum punishment of one year imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. Id. at 1924
n.1 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 40.6-391(c) (1982) ).
180 Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.
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Sentencing Guidelines, the defendant was assessed a criminal history
point for the 1983 uncounseled misdemeanor conviction. 181 The inclu-
sion of the uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in the calculation of
the sentencing range increased Nichols's possible range of imprison-
ment from 168-210 months to 188-235 months. 182
The defendant in Nichols challenged the inclusion of the prior
uncounseled conviction in the calculation of his criminal history cate-
gory for the purpose of imposing the sentence on the possession
charge)" Nichols argued that inclusion of the misdemeanor convic-
tion violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and specifically
contradicted the Supreme Court's holding in Baldasar. 184 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee rejected the
defendant's arguments and stated that the Baldasar opinion only pro-
hibited a court's use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor to "create"
a felony with a prison term.'" That is, the court limited Baldasar to its
facts and held that a court could not convert a subsequent misde-
meanor into a felony that required jail time by using a prior uncoun-
seled misdemeanor. 186 The district court concluded that Baldasar did
not bar the use of the prior uncounseled misdemeanor for enhance-
ment of the sentence in this case, as the charge was already a felony
and was not being converted from a misdemeanor to a felony. 187 The
district court sentenced the defendant to the maximum sentence un-
der the enhanced range, 235 months.'ss
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the district court's" The Sixth Circuit agreed with the
district court's reasoning that Baldasar barred the use of an uncoun-
seled misdemeanor only if it converted a misdemeanor to a felony.'""
Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that Baldasar permitted the use
of the valid prior uncounseled misdemeanor to enhance the defen-
dant's current sentence."'
181 Id. at 1924. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
calculation of sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
182 Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.
183 Id,
184 Id.
185 United States v. Nichols, 763 1 Stipp. 277, 279-80 (E.D. Tenn. 1991), aff'd, 979 F.2d 402
(6th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
18" See id.
187 See id.
188 /d. at 281. This sentence was 25 months longer than the maximum sentence would have
been if the district court did not use the uncounseled misdemeanor in calculating the criminal
history category. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1925.
185 United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 414 (6th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
19°./d. at 417.48.
181 Id.
576	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 37:557
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 192 and held
that a court properly could use a prior uncounseled misdemeanor to
enhance a subsequent sentence. 19" Nichols argued that, under Baldasar
and related cases, an individual could not be imprisoned without the
representation of counsel.'" As Nichols's sentence was enhanced by
his prior uncounseled conviction by fifteen months, he argued that the
district court had imposed imprisonment without the benefit of coun-
sel.'" Nichols argued that in order to maintain the integrity of the
Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court should bar the use
of the prior uncounseled misdemeanors in sentence enhancement.' 96
In the alternative, if the Court felt compelled to clarify the rule of
Baldasar, Nichols argued that the "authorized imprisonment" rule as
set forth in Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Baldasar provided a
clear and consistent rule that the Court should adopt. 197
The United States, as respondent, attempted to distinguish Balda-
sar from the present case and also argued that the opinion itself had
resulted in a great deal of problems in application.'" The government
argued that because the Baldasar opinion seemed contrary to current
policy and sentencing practice, the Court should reassess its position
on the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanors for sentence enhance-
ment.'" The government advocated the Court's overruling Baldasar
and permitting the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanors for sen-
tence enhancement purposes. 2"
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the government
and overruled Baldasar in a six to three decision. 20 ' The Court recog-
nized the problems and uncertainties created by the Baldasar opin-
ion.2°2 The Court reasoned that enhancement statutes do not change
the actual penalty imposed for the prior conviction and that enhance-
ment is consistent with generally accepted principles of sentencing
standards and procedures.'" Therefore, the Court concluded that a
192
 Nichols V. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921,1925 (1994).
199 Id. at 1927.
194








201 Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.
202 Id. at 1926-27.
209 Id. at 1927-28. The Court stated that sentencing requires less exacting standards than
convictions. Id. at 1927. The Court further stated that there is no requirement under the Due
May 1996]	 UNCOUNSELED MISDEMEANORS 	 577
court properly could use a valid uncounseled misdemeanor to enhance
the sentence of a subsequent conviction." 04
Justice Souter, in a concurring opinion, asserted that although he
agreed with the outcome in this case, he was uneasy about the Court's
broad language in overruling Baldasar given the scheme of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines:205
 According to Justice Souter, sentence enhance-
ment was valid in this case because the Guidelines explicitly permit
federal judges to consider the unreliability of the prior uncounseled
conviction.206
 Thus, he reasoned, if the judge does not believe that the
Criminal History Category accurately represents the seriousness of the
crimes, the judge may "downward depart" from the calculated range
under the Guidelines.'" Because the Guidelines contained built-in
safeguards, Justice Souter asserted that they adequately protect the
Sixth Amendment right to counse1. 2°8
 Justice Souter hesitated, however,
to endorse the constitutionality of the use of uncounseled misdemean-
ors in all sentencing schemes. 209
 According to Justice Souter, other
schemes, unlike the Guidelines, may not contain adequate safeguards
against constitutional violations of the right to a fair trial through the
assistance of counsel."'°
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg,
dissented on the grounds that the Court's Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence had primarily concerned itself with the fact that no defen-
dant should be deprived of liberty without the representation of coun-
sel.'" Based on this jurisprudence, Justice Blackmun proposed a rule
whereby courts could never use prior uncounseled misdemeanors
in sentence enhancement. 21" Because of the inherent unreliability in
all types of uncounseled convictions, Justice Blackmun asserted that
the Court should not distinguish between prior uncounseled felonies
and misdemeanors in sentence enhancement. 2 9ustice Blackmun rea-
Process Clause that an individual be warned that a conviction may he used in the future. Id. at
1928.
2°4 Id.
2°5 Id. at 1931 (Souter, J., concurring).
206
 Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1930-31 (Sauter j., concurring).
207 /d. at 1930 (Souter, J., concurring).
208 See id. at 1931 (Souter, J., concurring).
2°9 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
210 See id. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter stated, "Because I prefer not to risk offend-
ing the principle that 'Nhe Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance
of necessity of deciding it,"' I concur only in the judgment." Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting
Aswander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,346 (1936)) (citation omitted).
211 Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1931 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
212 /d. at 1935 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
213 1d. at 1935-36 (Blackinund., dissenting).
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soned that the prohibition on the use of uncounseled felonies in
sentence enhancement should similarly extend to uncounseled misde-
meanors. 214 This bright-line rule of barring the use of prior uncounse-
led misdemeanors in sentence enhancement would also provide, ac-
cording to Justice Blackmun, a workable rule for lower courts.215 He
reasoned that the rule was workable because lower courts would not
need to interpret and second guess the Supreme Court's decision and
reasoning.216
 Justice Blackmun asserted that the Court's holding in this
case, on the other hand, would create confusion and inadequate pro-
tection of a fundamental constitutional right. 217
After Nichols, courts could enhance a sentence through the use of
a prior uncounseled misdemeanor without running afoul of the Sixth
Amendment and related jurisprudence.218 The Supreme Court in
Nichols expressed concern with the rule of Baldasar and the inability
of lower courts to apply the meaning of that case with any consis-
tency.219 For this reason, the Court overruled Baldasar and announced
a rule, for the sake of consistency, that permits courts to enhance
sentences, without limitation, based on prior uncounseled misdemean-
ors. 220
IV. NICHOLS AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Nichols, although
appearing to promote consistency and predictability in its application,
is troubling in several respects. 221 First, the opinion was written in
214 See id. at 1935-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The subsequent use of uncounseled felonies
is prohibited by Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115-16 (1967).
215 Nichols, 114 S. CL at 1936 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun recognized that
as a consequence of this rule courts would have to appoint more counsel for misdemeanor cases.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He concluded, however, that this was a slight cost in order to
safeguard the Sixth Amendment. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
216 See id. at 1936 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217 See id. at 1936-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate
dissenting opinion. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1937 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She asserted that the
Courts opinion in Nichols "turns what was a disposition allowing no jail time—a disposition made
for one day and case alone—into ajudgment of far heavier weight." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
She also stated that the issue in this case was different from the issue in Custis v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994), where the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant had no right
to collaterally attack a prior state conviction used to enhance the current sentence. Nichols, 114
S. Ct. at 1937 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
218 See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927, 1928.
219 1d. at 1926-27.
229 See id. at 1927-28.
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response to an administrative problem of inconsistent application of
the Court's Baldasar opinion, rather than on the basis of sound con-
stitutional principles. 222 Second, the decision in Nichols itself is incon-
sistent with the Court's well-reasoned precedent on the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counse1. 223
 As such, individuals may now receive a prison
term without the assistance of counsel contrary to the Court's long-
standing Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 224
 Third, the variety of ap-
plications of Baldasar indicate that the Court, in resolving the problem
created by Baldasar, ignored alternatives that would have provided
greater constitutional protections to criminal defendants than its hold-
ing in Nichols. 225
A. Nichols: A Response to the Confusion Created by Baldasar
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Nichols was prem-
ised on the need to resolve the confusion created by Baldasar rather
than on sound constitutional principles. 226
 Justice Powell's prediction
in Baldasar that the opinion would create a great deal of difficulty and
confusion for lower courts was accurate. 227 Baldasar's lack of a majority
opinion created a great deal of inconsistent case law at both the federal
and state levels. 225
In addition, section 4A1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines seemed to support a result contrary to the holding in Baldasar. 229
The Guidelines's endorsement of the validity of the use of prior un-
counseled misdemeanors undoubtedly played a role in the Supreme
Court's decision in Nicho/s. 2'" Indeed, the Court referred to the Guide-
lines as reflective of the confusion over the Baldasar decision."'
222 Sce infra notes 226-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Nichols decision as
a response to the confusion created by Baldasar.
223
 &T ROLL Y. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37,
40 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
224 See Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Gt. 1921, 1927, 1928 (1994); Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74;
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37, 40.
225 See infra notes 277-311 and accompanying text for a discussion of the alternatives to the
Supreme Court's holding in Nichols,
M N/chats, 114 S. Ct. at 1926-27.
227 See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 234 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Fu, supra note
110, at 175.
228 See supra notes 140-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of inconsistent lower court
application of Baldasar, See also, Novak, supra note 138, at 769-74 for a general discussion of
the problems associated with plurality opinions.
225 See USSG, supra note 157, g 4A1.2 & Commentary, Background. See supra notes 157-72
and accompanying text for a discussion of the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
235 See 114 S. Ct. at 1927 n.11.
231 Id. at 1927. The Court referred to a publication by the Commission which stated, "The
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The splintering of the Court in Baldasar, in addition to the con-
fusion and lack of consistency in lower courts and the Guidelines,
made the issue ripe for review. 232 As the Supreme Court stated in
Nichols, "[t]his degree of confusion following a splintered decision
such as Baldasar is itself a reason for reexamining that decision."233 The
fact that the Guidelines, and indeed other courts, were confused by
Baldasar and chose to ignore its holding, however, seems a tenuous
reason for the Court's rejection of a constitutional right. 234 Indeed, it
seems that the central reason for the Court's holding in Nichols was
pressure from external sources such as the Guidelines. 235 In its haste
to clarify the rule of Baldasar, however, the Supreme Court may have
taken away an important constitutional right once found in the Sixth
Amendment.236 Arguably, the cost of consistency in clarifying the issue
was high.
B. Nichols 's Inconsistency with Sixth Amendment Precedent
Despite the strong need to remedy the inconsistent application of
Baldasar, the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Nichols ap-
pears inconsistent with its own Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 237 At
first blush, the majority opinion in Nichols seems to address and solve
the problem created by Baldasar."8 It supplies a clear-cut rule: A court
may subsequently enhance a later sentence with a valid uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction. 239 Even though this rule is clear and straight-
forward, it is inconsistent with the Court's long-standing Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel jurisprudence.240
Under Scott and Argersinger, the Court's concern was whether a
court deprived an individual of his or her liberty without due process
of the law.241 To prevent the deprivation of liberty without due process
Commission does not believe the inclusion of sentences resulting from constitutionally valid,
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions in the criminal history score is foreclosed by Baldasar u.
Illinois . . . ," Id, at n,11,
232 See id. at 1927.
239 id.
234 See supra notes 140-56, 157-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of inconsistent
lower court application of Baldasar and the Sentencing Guidelines.
235 See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1926, 1927 & n.11.
236 See id. at 1931 (Blackmun, J„ dissenting),
237 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37,
40 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
23" See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1926-27,
235 Id. at 1928.
24° See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); Scott, 440
U.S. at 373-74; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37, 40.
241 Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37, 40.
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of law, the Court fashioned a rule whereby the right to counsel existed
if imprisonment resulted. 242 The rule of Scott and Argersinger provided
an adequate safeguard against the denial of due process of law in
misdemeanor cases by protecting the right to counsel when the defen-
dant was actually sentenced to imprisonment. 243
The Baldasar decision extended Sixth Amendment protection to
cases where a subsequent proceeding deprived a defendant of his or
her liberty through the use of a valid conviction obtained without the
assistance of counsel. 244 Although no single opinion in Baldasar com-
manded the assent of a majority of the justices, one theme emerges
from the three concurring opinions. 2" The subsequent use of a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor to increase a prison sentence, at least in
the facts of Baldasar, constituted a violation of due process of law and
the Sixth Amendment right to counse1. 246
This consistent theme runs through the concurrences in Baldasar
and the cases dealing with the Sixth Amendment right to counse1. 247
Justice Marshall's concurrence in Baldasar focused on the reasoning
of Scott and Argersinger. 2 4 8 These cases emphasized that a deprivation
of liberty without the benefit of the right to counsel violated due
process. 249 Justice Stewart stated that it was clear to him, based on prior
jurisprudence, that the result in Baldasar was correct. 2" Justice Stewart
therefore implicitly adopted the reasoning that a deprivation of liberty
cannot exist without counse1. 25 ' Further, Justice Blackmun, whose con-
currence advocated the six month authorized imprisonment bright-
line rule, stated that the result in Baldasar nonetheless was consistent
with that rule.252 Therefore, even though Justice Blackmun preferred
the more stringent six month rule to protect the right to counsel, he
too recognized, at a minimum, the importance of protecting the right
to counsel at some level. 253
242 See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74,
243 See id.; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37, 40; accord Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1931 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
244 Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224 (per curiam); id. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring).
245 See id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring); id, at 230
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
246 See id.
247 See id.; Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37, 40.
248 Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 225-26 (Marshall, J., concurring).
249 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
256 1d. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
251 See id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
252 Id. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
453 See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Baldasar lacked a majority opinion, and yet, a consistent theme or
principle emerged from the three concurring opinions. 254 The Su-
preme Court has indicated that in the absence of a majority, the
concurrence with the narrowest reasoning should be adopted. 255 All
three concurring opinions in Baldasar share one common and narrow
reasoning: 256
 the deprivation of liberty cannot occur without the right
to counsel.'" Arguably, the Court should have maintained this ration-
ale in clarifying the issue of the collateral use of uncounseled misde-
meanors in sentence enhancement in Nichols.255
Nichols does not overrule the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence of
Scott and Argersinger. 259
 The opinion does not suggest that those cases
are no longer valued in evaluating the Sixth Amendment right to
counse1.26° The Court in Nichols did, however, reverse Baldasar—not
on the theory that the cases underlying the decision were faulty in their
reasoning, but rather for the sake of consistency in application. 26 '
Based on the fact that the prior precedent in the area of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel focused on the deprivation of liberty
without the benefit of counsel, Nichols is inconsistent with that case
law.'" The Court has consistently recognized that sentence enhance-
ment does nothing more than modify the sentence for a current crime
and does not change the prior sentence. 263 Even given this under-
standing, a defendant under the scheme created by Nichols can receive
a term of imprisonment based only on the prior uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction. 264
 For example, if a maximum sentence for a crime
is one year, but with enhancement by a prior uncounseled misde-
meanor that sentence increases to one and one-half years, a court is
imposing a sentence of six months for no reason other than the prior
254 See supra notes 244-53 and accompanying text lOr a discussion of common reasoning in
concurring opinions in Baldasar.
255
 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,193 (1977).
256 See supra notes 244-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of common reasoning in
concurring opinions in Baldasar.
257
 See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring);
id. at 230 (Blackmun, j., concurring).
258
 See infra notes 259-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inconsistency of
Nichols with Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
259 See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1926-27.
26° See id. at 1925,1927.
261 See id. at 1926-27.
262 See id. at 1927,1928 (majority); id. at 1931 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Baldasar, 446 U,S.
at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 228 (Marshall, j., concurring); id. at 230 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
265 see, e.g.,
264 See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927.
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,451 & n.5 (1962).
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conviction. In that case, the individual would not face the additional
six months imprisonment but for the prior uncounseled misdemeanor.
Logically, the deprivation of liberty, specifically the addition of six
months imprisonment, is a direct result of the uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction,
This result is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court prece-
dents of Scott and Argersinger and the rationale underlying the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel." The result, though permissible under
Nichols, is clearly inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence on which the Nichols Court based its opinion.2" Insofar as the
Court's decision in Nichols permits this type of deprivation of liberty
without the benefit of counsel, it is contrary to Sixth Amendment
precedent. 267
Permitting the use of uncounseled misdemeanors for sentence
enhancement across the board seriously undermines the right to be
free from the deprivation of liberty without the assistance of counse1. 266
The problems with misdemeanor convictions, as addressed in Scott and
Argersinger, are still realistic concerns in our criminal justice system. 26"
If individuals are rushed through misdemeanor court without counsel,
they will not know the potential impact of a guilty plea."' Their right,
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to effective assistance
of counsel is denied as they are not aware of the potential implications
of their act."' An individual may plead guilty to avoid jail while unaware
that in the future, that plea may be used to increase a sentence and
result in jail time."' Under Nichols, a misdemeanor defendant's igno-
rance in representing him or herself may ultimately lead to a sentence
of imprisonment through an enhancement statute for a subsequent
crime.'"
In the Court's haste to solve the problem of inconsistency created
by Baldasar, it rushed to a decision that exacts a high toll on constitu-
265
 See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227-28 (Marshall, J., concurring); Scott y. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
373-74 (1979); Argersinger v, Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 40 (1972).
266
 See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927; supra notes 201-04, 237-64 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Court's reasoning in Nichols and its inconsistency with Sixth Amendment precedent).
267
 See supra notes 237-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inconsistency of
Nichols with Sixth Amendment precedent.
26R See Nichols, 114 S. Ct_ at 1927 (majority); id. at 1931 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
265 See Gerald R. Wheeler, The Benefits of Legal Representation in Misdemeanor Court, 19 CRIM.
L. BULL. 221, 230-32 (1983).
275 See Aiwa-singer, 407 U.S. 47-48, 63 & n.32 (Powell, J., concurring).
271 See id. (Powell, J., concurring).
272
 See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1935-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
275 See id. at 1927, 1928.
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tional rights.274 Under the scheme announced by Nichols, the Court has
ignored the concerns that formed the center of analysis under the
Sixth Amendment. 275 An individual in misdemeanor court is now left
without adequate procedural safeguards to protect the right not to be
sent to prison without the assistance of counsel. 27°
C. Alternatives to the Court's Holding in Nichols
Nichols's inconsistency with Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is
especially disturbing given the many other options available to the
Supreme Court that would have been more protective of the Sixth
Amendment right to counse1. 277 The Court in Nichols, forced by exter-
nal pressures, opted for administrative ease at the expense of constitu-
tional jurisprudence. 278 The Court was not compelled, however, to
permit the unmitigated use of prior uncounseled misdemeanors in its
attempt to clarify the confusion created by Baldasar as it had other
options more protective of the constitutional right to counse1. 27°
First, the Court easily could have limited its precise holding in
Nichols to the facts of the case presented for review. 280 Specifically, the
Court could have permitted federal courts, which are covered by the
scheme of the Sentencing Guidelines, and other jurisdictions with
similar safeguards to use uncounseled misdemeanors in sentence en-
hancement, but prohibited their use in all other jurisdictions."' That
is, the Court could have given judges the discretion, under appropriate
recidivist schemes, to decide whether the prior uncounseled misde-
meanor adequately reflected the severity of the prior crime before
using it to enhance a sentence. 282 Justice Sauter advanced this position
274 See id. at 1926-27 (majority); id. at 1931 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
275'
	 id. at 1931 (Blackmun, j., dissenting); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979);
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37, 40.
276 See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927, 1928; Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at
37, 40.
277 See infra notes 280-307 and accompanying text for a discussion of alternatives to the
Supreme Court's decision in Nichols.
278 See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1926-27. See supra notes 226-76 and accompanying text for a
discussion of problems with the Baldasar decision.
279 See infra notes 280-307 and accompanying text for a discussion of alternatives to the
Supreme Court's decision in Nichols.
28° See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1931 (Souter, J., concurring).
25L See id. at 1930-31 (Souter, J., concurring).
282 See id. at 1930 (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing the constitutional safeguards found
within the Sentencing Guidelines). In order to effectuate this scheme, the Court could have
required that states incorporate safeguards into their own recidivist statutes to lower the risk of
offending due process if their courts use prior uncounseled misdemeanors in sentence enhance-
ment. This decision also would have overruled Baldasar and its related problems; however, due
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in his concurrence in Nichols. 283 Had the Court limited the holding in
this way, the Sixth Amendment would have been protected by ensuring
that individuals were not unfairly deprived of their liberty without
counsel, while also permitting the use of uncounseled misdemeanors
in many enhancement schemes. 284
In addition, the Supreme Court could have adhered to its holding
in Baldasar and clarified the rule of that opinion through the adoption
of a cohesive rule and rationale based on the reasoning in Scott and
Argersinger. 285 Specifically, the Court could have promulgated several
rules that would have both eliminated the confusion in lower courts
with respect to the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanors in sentence
enhancement and remained true to the constitutional right to coun-
se1. 288 Given that other courts had already adopted different rules on
the issue, the Supreme Court could have looked for a rule that pro-
vided both administrative efficiency and constitutional protection of
the right to counse1. 287
First, the Court could have adopted the six month authorized
imprisonment bright-line rule as advocated by Justice Blackmun and
thereby provided a minimum protection under the Sixth Amendment
to those who faced potential imprisonment of six months or more. 288
This standard would have been clear and unequivocal: A court could
use a prior uncounseled misdemeanor to enhance a subsequent sen-
tence only if the authorized imprisonment for the uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction was six months or less.'" Six months authorized
imprisonment was already the bench mark for other constitutional
rules such as the right to a jury tria1. 29" Also, since Argersinger, the six
month rule had been suggested as a viable alternative in determining
when the right to counsel should attach in criminal cases.m Given that
process of law and the right to counsel would have been protected by the constitutional require-
ments in the enhancement statutes. See id. at 1930-31 (Souter, J., concurring).
288 See id. (Souter, J., concurring).
284 See id. (Souter, J., concurring).
285 See supra notes 59-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of Scott and Argersinger
286 See infra notes 140-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of inconsistent lower court
application of Baldasar.
287 See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1931 (Souter, J., concurring); .supra notes 140-56 and accompa-
nying text (discussing inconsistent lower court application of Baldasar).
288 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1979) (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
289 See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
290 See Scott, 440 U.S. at 390 (Blackmun,
	 dissenting); Duncan v, Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
159, 161 (1968).
29-I See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (Blackmun,.]., concurring); Scott, 440
U.S. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 41 (1972) (Burger,
CJ., concurring).
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this bright-line rule would have clarified the confusion of Baldasar
while retaining a minimum level of Sixth Amendment protection, it
appears a better approach than the approach of the Supreme Court
in Nichols, which permits the unequivocal use of prior uncounseled
misdemeanors in sentence enhancement. 292
Second, the Court could have adopted the "conversion rule" as
an alternative to permitting enhancement based on prior uncounseled
convictions without limitation. 293
 The conversion rule would prohibit
a court from using a prior uncounseled misdemeanor to convert a
subsequent misdemeanor into a felony. 294 This standard would have
been a strict application of the facts of Baldasar. 2" In fact, the district
court and the Sixth Circuit in the Nichols case adopted the conversion
standard. 296
 The conversion rule adheres to Baldasar and ensures the
protection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a class of cases
where the imposition of a sentence through enhancement based on a
prior uncounseled misdemeanor is especially violative of the Court's
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence."' In this situation, a misdemeanor
is "raised" to a felony, a type of crime in which the Court has been un-
willing to weaken its requirements of the right to counsel."' This clear,
bright-line rule remains faithful to the rationale underlying Scott and
Argersinger and is therefore a better approach than the one adopted
by the Court in Nichols. 299
Similarly, the Court could have adopted the "absolute bar rule"
and provided the greatest amount of Sixth Amendment protection. 30°
The absolute bar rule, similar to the rationale of Justice Marshall's
concurrence in Baldasar, would prohibit the use of all prior uncoun-
seled misdemeanors in sentence enhancement."' This bright-line rule
would have clarified the confusion of Baldasar and thereby eased the
292 See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927, 1928.
293 See, e.g., Wilson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 1158, 1159 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980).
294 See id.
"5
 See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 223.
296 See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of lower court opinions
in Nichols.
297 See supra notes 59-109, 111-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of Scott., Argersin-
ger and Baldasar's Sixth Amendment protections.
298 See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the prohibition on the
use of uncounseled felony convictions in sentence enhancement.
299 See supra notes 59-109, 201-04 and accompanying text for a discussion of Scott and
Argersinger and the Supreme Court's reasoning in Nichols.
399 See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of those courts that apply
the absolute bar rule.
301
 See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Court's administrative concerns in Nichols."' At the same time, this
approach would have provided the most comprehensive protection
against the deprivation of liberty without due process of the law under
the Sixth Amendment by prohibiting the imposition of an enhanced
sentence based on a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction." 3
Finally, the Court could have adopted a rule that permitted a
sentencing court to use a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
for enhancement unless enhancement resulted in a sentence greater
than what was originally permissible under the statute. 3°4 This standard
is most consistent with Scott and Argersinger where the Court required
counsel only in cases of actual imprisonment. 305
 This standard, also a
bright-line rule, would permit judges to move to the higher end of the
sentencing range for the current crime based on their knowledge of
the prior conviction, but no higher."' This rule would ensure that no
sentence of imprisonment was imposed solely because of the prior
uncounseled conviction and therefore provide greater protection of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel than the rule adopted by the
Court in Nicho/s. 807
Given the options available to the Court and the fact that they
would have been less restrictive on the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, it seems that the Nichols Court was more concerned with
clarifying the rule of Baldasar than with the protection of the Consti-
tution. 308 In the Court's haste to clarify Baldasar, it drastically curtailed
the Sixth Amendment right to counse1. 309
 The rule announced by
Nichols raises a real threat that due process of the law will be denied
"2 See Nichols, 114 S. CL at 1926-27.
"3 See supra notes 59-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of Scott and A ger Inger.
This rule would have eased all the constitutional concerns expressed in the concurring opinions
in Baldasar. See 446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring); id.
at 250 (Blackinund, concurring).
$'34 See, e.g., Moore v. State, 352 S.E.2d 821, 822 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 904
(1987); State v. Laurick, 575 A.2d. 1340, 1347 (N.J.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 (1990).
"5 See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37, 40.
"6 See Moore v. State, 352 S.E.2d 821, 822 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 904 (1987);
State v. Laurick, 575 A.2d 1340, 1347 (N.J.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 (1990). This rule is also
consistent with the safeguards of the United States Sentencing Guidelines pointed out by Justice
Souter in his concurring opinion in Nichols. See 114 S. Ct. at 1930 (Sower, J., concurring).
3°7
 See Nichols, 114 S. CL at 1927, 1928; Scott, 440 U,S. at 373-74; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at
37, 40.
3°8 See supra notes 226-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Nichols as a response
to the confusion created by Baldasar.
"9
 See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37, 40; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 34445 (1963); supra notes 261-76 and accompanying text (discussing why the Court's
haste to clarify Baldasar undermined Sixth Amendment jurisprudence).
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in systems that do not provide the same procedural safeguards as the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. 310 This is very troubling in light
of the available, less restrictive alternatives to the Court's holding in
Nichois.3"
CONCLUSION
The right to counsel is a fundamental tenet of due process and
an essential element of the right to a fair tria1. 312
 Whenever a defendant
is deprived of liberty, through a sentence of imprisonment, the right
to counsel attaches regardless of the classification of the crime. 313 Influ-
enced by the hostility of certain courts and the Sentencing Guidelines
to the prohibition of the use of these uncounseled convictions in
sentence enhancement, the Supreme Court now permits the enhance-
ment of a prison sentence based on an uncounseled conviction. 314 This
result is difficult to reconcile with Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 3 ' 5
Especially disturbing about the Court's decision in Nichols is that
there were alternatives that would have clarified the rule, yet provided
adequate safeguards to the Sixth Amendment. 316
 The Court seems to
have been inspired, either consciously or otherwise, by the "anti-defen-
dants rights" movement that is sweeping the nation. 317 In responding
to the nation's great fear of the epidemic of violence, the Court has
undermined a fundamental doctrine of the Constitution. 318 The shift
of focus away from protecting the due process rights of defendants to
the need to control crime and criminals carries a very high expense
in the area of constitutional jurisprudence. Important historical doc-
trines may now be undermined as a result of the near hysterical
national reaction to crime control issues.319
 As the Supreme Court's
31° See Nichols, 114 S. CL at 1929-31 (Sumer, J., concurring).
l See supra notes 277-307 and accompanying text for a discussion of the alternatives to the
Court's holding in Nichols.
312 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
313
 See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373
-74; Aigeoinger, 407 U.S. at 37, 40.
319 See supra notes 226-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Nichols as a response
to the confusion created by Baldasar.
313 See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37, 40; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45;
Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
016 See supra notes 277-307 and accompanying text for a discussion of the alternatives to the
Court's holding in Nichols.
317 See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the anti-due-process-
rights movement.
315 See supra notes 261-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the Court's haste
to clarify Baldasar undermined Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
31° See supra notes 5-16, 261-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the historical
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decision in Nichols demonstrates, the Court is not immune from the
shift in the national psyche on matters concerning criminals. 320 Even
though there were alternatives that were less restrictive on the Consti-
tution, the Court in Nichols adopted the approach that was most harsh
on the criminal defendant. 321 The result of this decision and others
that may be inspired by the national mood bears a high cost in terms
of our constitutional protections under the Bill of Rights.
KIRSTEN M. NELSON
development of the right to counsel and why the Court's haste to clarify Baldasar undermined
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
320 See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927, 1928.
321 See supra notes 277-307 and accompanying text for a discussion of the alternatives to the
Court's holding in Nichols.
